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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : No. 940624-CA 
vs. : District Ct. No. 941900597 
JOE RAKES, : Category 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
COMES NOW the Appellant to the above-captioned matter 
(hereinafter "Defendant"), by and through counsel, and hereby 
submits the following as his brief of Appellant herein: 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court of Appeals pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f), and the provisions of Rule 26 
(2) (a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, whereby the 
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Defendant in a district court criminal action may take an appeal to 
the Utah Court of Appeals from a final order for anything other 
than a first degree or capital felony. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from two final judgments and convictions 
rendered by the Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge, Third District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The judgments 
and convictions were for Distribution of a Controlled Substance, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 
(i) (a) (ii), and Attempted Distribution of a Controlled Substance, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 
(i) (a) (iv) . In particular, Defendant appeals the District Court's 
denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES, AND RULES, ETC. 
There is no case law authority, nor statutory authority 
believed by Defendant to be wholly dispositive or wholly 
determinative of the issues raised on appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"Appellate courts "review the ultimate decision to deny a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse of discretion 
standard."" State v. Stilling, 856 P. 2d 666, 670 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) (quoting State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 293, 295 (Utah 1992). 
The findings of fact of the trial court which lead to its ultimate 
decision will not be set aside "unless they are clearly erroneous." 
Id. However, "the trial court's ruling regarding substantial 
compliance with constitutional and procedural requirements for 
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entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is reviewed for 
correctness." Id., citing Willet v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860, 861 
(Utah 1992); State v. Hoff. 814 P.: - ::. • • --i 1991). 
Further, the Utah Court of Appeals has held that "ineffective 
assistance of counsel falls on the end of the spectrum subject to 
de n o v o r e v i e w of che uiilinaLe -ji . . iuu ul " /liei. her ciu'-1 
defendant has received ineffective assistance • - counsel in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment." State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 
1239 (Utah Ct. A p p . 19yb) . Utah t-upr-"ii^ .*i z ai i< i I It :ah Coi n t )f 
Appeals decisions on the ineffective assistance of counsel issue 
have shown no deference to whatever action the trial court took in 
its application of the law See State v. Lopez, 886 P.. 2d 1105, 
1113 14 (Utah 1994); State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 545-46 (Utah 
19'; : itate v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); 
State v. Harry, 8 73 P.2d 114 9, 115 1 (Utah Ct App, 1994) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, with 
the crime of Unlawful Distribution of. a Controlled .'ubstance, a 
Second Degree Felony, as well as Unlawful Possession of a 
Controlled Substance with the Intent to Distribute, a Second Degree 
Felony. These charges were filed under case numbers 941900595FS 
and 941900597FS, respectively, Defendant was also charged with 
other minor counts under these case numbers, as well as under case 
numbers 941900594 and 9419 0 0 59 6. Th< ; t s e < : ase : were 
consolidated into one case. On July :i 8, 1994, Defendant appeared 
before the Honorable John A. Rokich, District Court Judge, and 
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entered a plea of guilty to the crimes of Attempted Possession of 
a Controlled Substance with the Intent to Distribute, a Third 
Degree Felony; as well as Distribution of a Controlled Substance, 
a Second Degree Felony. On August 18, 1994, thirty-one days after 
the entry of Defendant's pleas, Defendant's counsel filed a motion 
to withdraw his pleas. (R.O.A. 119). On September 21, 1994, the 
court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
Denying Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas. (R.O.A. 125) . 
The trial court based its denial of Defendant's motion on its 
findings that the motion to withdraw the pleas was outside the 
thirty-day period set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6, Defendant 
was sufficiently experienced in the justice system to understand 
fully what he was doing when he entered his pleas, and that 
Defendant had knowingly entered the guilty pleas. Copies of the 
motion for withdrawal and order denying the motion are attached 
hereto, designated as Appendix "A" and Appendix "B", respectively. 
Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of zero to 
five years in the Utah State Prison for the third degree felony and 
an indeterminate term of zero to fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison for the second degree felony. The trial court ordered these 
sentences to run concurrently. A copy of the Judgment, Sentence, 
and Commitment Orders are attached hereto, designated as Appendix 
"C" and "D", respectively. 
Defendant filed a timely Notice of Appeal on October 11, 1994. 
Defendant's original defense counsel was then discharged, and 
Defendant was appointed conflict counsel. Defendant then filed a 
4 
Motion for Extension of Time in which to File Appeal Brief as well 
i \ i Mot inn tu Romand for Determination of Ineffective Assistance 
of Counsel Defendant' s Motion {.or Remand wdu dei lied 1 :»> t .1 KE : I Jt .al I 
Court of Appeals on July l '. >•>-:-'••. and again on September l, 1995. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant was prosecuted in Salt Lake County, SI .itv.-; <»! Utah, 
for the crime of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance with 
Inte, " • • • • • ' iegree felony, on March 28, 1994. 
(Amended Information, i; *• Defendant was also pr osecuted 
for driving under the influence and driving on a suspended license. 
(Amended Information, R 0 i \ 6 6 ) Each of these charges were 
brought under case number 941900597FS Defendant was 
prosecuted for Unlawful Distribution of. a Controlled Substance, 
second degree felony under case number 
941900595FS. (Information, R.O.A. . .• j-se cases were later 
consolidated Judith A. Jensen of the Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Associat; i oi I entered an Appearai ice of Coi mse] on behalf of Defendant 
on March 31, 1994. (R.O.A. 1 1 and 72.) 
The Defendant was bound over and arraigned in district court 
HI M,JV l\ !QQ-l ( 76.) Defendant entered not guilty 
pleas on that date and the court scheduled a urial date. (R.O.A. 
15 and 76. ) 
OiI July 18, 1994, Defendant appeared before the Court for a 
change of plea hearing ; :.o.A. 128.) Defendant entered a plea of 
guilty _ Av-t crime of unlawful distribution of a controlled 
substance, , : i iai;- ! •• • =1 i C o d e A,i n i 58-37-8 (l)(a)(ii), a 
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second degree felony. (R.O.A. 137.) Defendant also entered a plea 
of guilty to attempted possession of a controlled substance with 
the intent to distribute, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 
(1) (a) (iv), a third degree felony. (R.O.A. 138.) The remaining 
counts of driving under the influence and driving on a suspended 
license, as well as all counts in the cases numbered 941900594, 
941900596, and another circuit court case, were dismissed. (R.O.A. 
140.) 
When Defendant entered these pleas, Defendant was under the 
impression that he was not bound to his guilty pleas if he withdrew 
the same within thirty days. (R.O.A. 142 - 145.) Defendant felt 
that by entering the pleas he would have thirty days within which 
to speak to potential witnesses about testifying at trial. (R.O.A. 
142.) Defendant believed these witnesses would be able to testify 
that the substance that was in Defendant's possession was not 
methamphetamine. (R.O.A. 145, lines 1-17.) Defendant also felt 
that during this time period he would have an opportunity to obtain 
a specific drug test on the evidence. (R.O.A. 163.) 
Defendant stated at his hearing to withdraw the pleas that the 
substance which was in his possession was not actually 
methamphetamine. (R.O.A. 163.) Defendant claimed that the 
substance he was arrested for distributing and possessing is white 
powder which had been purchased legally at local gasoline stations. 
(R.O.A. 144, lines 3-7.) It is a legal "over-the-counter" 
substance to help persons stay awake. 
In addition, Defendant also spoke to Mr. Crouch at the 
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pharmacology department at the University of Utah (R.O.A. 148, 
lines 1 r) • •! 8 . ) Defendant learned rhar *~Np possibility of receiving 
a false positive test <)ii - M.-
methamphetamine is quite possible. (R.O.A 114, lines 20-25, 145, 
line^ -his f a i s e positive IIMV o^nr - :n both a police field 
test as , . . ,is the test which is \\- :, . I IK.-' .-'Ldle rriun1 Idb. 
(R.O \ . : : iries a-12.) Mr, Crouch informed Defendant that he 
hrui - : . isrform a test: which would prove whether or not 
there was a false positive result in this n 1.1. nal i cu i K u ,'\ t 18, 
lines 21-25 . ) 
' - -i :---- Pendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas 
was held on. September 12, 1994. The Court denied Defendan* ; 
motion. I- . " ho Defendant was sentenced on September 
•*'• > serve .: --.--t -rnuiate term in the Utah State Prison of 
one to fifteen years for the second degree felony charge as well as 
an indeterminate term of zero to five years for the third degree 
felony rharge, i"<'» I >»-' served concurrent! } ;r, (R.O.A. 160.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant was prosecuted for unlawful distribution of a 
c o i 11 r o 11 e d s i :i b s t: a n c e a i id i i n ] awful possession of a controlled 
substance with the intent to distribute. The second charge was 
later amended to attempted unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance with the intent to distribute. However, Defendant has 
maintained that the substance which was in his possession was not 
actually methamphetamine and was, in fact, a re-heated version of 
ai I o ; 7 er the coi inter prodi ict si mi ] ar to "No-Doz" . 
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At the time Defendant entered his guilty pleas, Defendant was 
under the impression that he would have the opportunity to withdraw 
the guilty pleas within thirty days. Defendant believed that 
within that thirty day period he would have an opportunity to 
contact witnesses to testify as to the true nature of the substance 
which was in Defendant's possession, as well as to obtain a more 
thorough drug test on the substance to prove that it was not 
methamphetamine. 
Further, the elements in the statement which Defendant signed 
in court at the time he initially entered his plea to attempted 
possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute 
were not correctly stated. In particular, the form failed to list 
the "knowing and intentional" elements of the crime. (R.O.A. 105.) 
(See Affidavit of Defendant/Appellant, attached hereto and 
designated as Appendix "E".) 
Additionally, Defendant timely requested that his attorney 
from the Legal Defenders Association file a motion to withdraw his 
guilty pleas. (See Affidavit of Defendant/Appellant, attached 
hereto and designated as Appendix "E".) This motion was not filed 
until thirty-one days after the entry of the plea, past the time 
limit for filing a motion to withdraw the pleas. The trial court 
specifically listed this as one of the reasons for which the motion 
to withdraw was denied. 
The pleas were entered unadvisedly. Defense counsel assisted 
Defendant ineffectively in this matter. The plea was entered 
unintelligently and involuntarily. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 11 
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of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Defendant did not enter 
his pleas with full knowledge and understanding of the nature and 
elements of the offense, nor the relation of the law to the facts 
of his case. Accordingly, Defendant's pleas of guilty should be 
withdrawn and this matter should be remanded for trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE 
DEFENDANT'S PLEA OF GUILTY BECAUSE THE SAME WAS ENTERED 
INTO UNKNOWINGLY, UNINTELLIGENTLY, AND INVOLUNTARILY. 
Defendant entered guilty pleas to the crimes of distribution 
of a controlled substance and attempted possession of a counterfeit 
substance with the intent to distribute. These pleas were entered 
under circumstances such that Defendant was unable to make a 
reasoned decision regarding entering the pleas. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1982) states, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
(1) A plea of guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior 
to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be 
withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with 
leave of the court, 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no 
contest is made by motion and shall be made 
within 30 days after the entry of the plea. 
In addition, Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure mandates in part: 
The court . . . may not accept the [guilty] plea 
until the court has found: 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the 
9 
presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory 
self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and 
cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, 
the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, 
and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) the defendant understands the nature and 
elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, 
that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of 
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
Utah R. Crime. P. 11(e). 
According to the Utah Supreme Court, M[t]he rationale for 
allowing a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea is to permit him to 
undo a plea which was unknowingly, unintelligently, or 
involuntarily made." State v. Galleaos, 738 P. 2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 
1987) . 
The Utah Supreme Court has also stated that "[t]he entry of a 
guilty plea involves the waiver of several important constitutional 
rights, including the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, the right to a trial by jury, and the right to 
confront witnesses. Because the entry of such a plea constitutes 
such a waiver, and because the prosecution will generally be unable 
to show that it will suffer any significant prejudice if the plea 
is withdrawn, a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
should, in general, be liberally granted." Galleaos, at 1042. 
In this matter the Defendant was under the false impression 
that the entry of the guilty pleas could be easily withdrawn and 
would also give him the opportunity to attempt to contact witnesses 
to testify for him on his own behalf and to obtain a new chemical 
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analysis on the substance. Further, Defendant's counsel had 
informed him that he definitely should enter the guilty pleas 
because he would not have an opportunity to obtain witnesses to 
testify in his behalf at trial. Defendant's trial counsel did not 
explain to him that a guilty plea could only be withdrawn for good 
cause. Defendant's trial counsel also did not explain to him that 
he could have an opportunity to attempt to locate witnesses and to 
obtain a more certain chemical analysis if he actually did proceed 
with trial rather than enter the guilty pleas. 
Defendant's lack of information and lack of communication from 
trial counsel led him to believe that the entry of a guilty plea 
would "buy him time" to investigate and prepare his defense for 
trial. Certainly this is a situation in which Defendant entered 
into the plea unknowingly and unintelligently. 
Further, the circumstances of this matter are such that the 
Defendant entered the guilty plea uninformed. "Concern for the 
legitimacy or truth of a guilty plea is an integral part of 
ascertaining the voluntariness of that plea. Utah R. Crim. P. 11 
(e) (2) requires the court to find that a guilty plea is voluntarily 
made before it accepts it. A guilty plea cannot be voluntary if it 
is uninformed." State v. Breckenridae, 688 P. 2d 440, 444 (Utah 
1983). Additionally, this Court has stated that "[t]o withdraw a 
guilty plea defendant must show good cause. Good cause exists 
where the plea was entered involuntarily." State v. Thorup, 841 
P.2d 746, 748 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Defendant believed that entry of the guilty pleas was a 
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procedure which could easily be overcome later. He was under the 
false impression that the pleas would be withdrawn as long as he 
made a motion to do so within thirty days. Defendant was unaware 
of the good cause requirement for withdrawing guilty pleas. It was 
Defendant's distinct belief that, by entering the guilty pleas, 
Defendant would have thirty additional days within which he would 
have an opportunity to speak with and obtain witnesses to testify 
on his behalf at trial concerning the true chemical nature of the 
substance with which Defendant was charged. Because Defendant's 
trial counsel had told him that he could not obtain such witnesses, 
Defendant believed that his only opportunity to establish a defense 
for himself, through witnesses, would be to enter a guilty plea and 
then use the "thirty-day period" he though he had to speak to 
potential witnesses himself. 
Because Defendant was uninformed, his guilty plea was 
involuntary. Therefore, Defendant's plea should be withdrawn. 
Moreover, Defendant's pleas were involuntary because he did 
not have a full understanding of the law in relation to the 
particular facts of his case. " [B]ecause a guilty plea is an 
admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it 
cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an 
understanding of the law in relation to the facts." McCarthy v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969) . See also State v. Gibbons, 740 
P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987) . 
The record as a whole in this matter does not indicate that 
Defendant entered his pleas with full knowledge and understanding 
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of the consequences and with the full knowledge of the nature and 
elements of the offense to which he was entering his pleas. 
Specifically, the form which Defendant was given to read prior to 
the pleas, and which he signed in open court regarding the second 
degree felony was incorrect. The form itself failed to list the 
elements of the crime. The elements of the crime, as stated in 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8 (1) (a) (iv) , are that it is unlawful for any 
person to knowingly and intentionally possess a controlled or 
counterfeit substance with intent to distribute, (emphasis added) 
However, in the form which Defendant signed, the elements of 
"knowing and intentional" were not listed. Therefore, the crime to 
which Defendant entered his plea was not properly stated to 
Defendant. 
Further, although Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure creates a presumption that the plea was entered 
voluntarily, "the trial court's compliance with Rule 11 does not 
foreclose the possibility that the court abused its discretion in 
refusing Defendant's motion if his plea was in fact involuntary." 
State v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 746, 748 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In this 
matter the trial court complied with the general requirements of 
Rule 11. But, as stated by this Court, "[m]ere general questions 
which ask whether a plea is 'voluntary' are insufficient under Rule 
11." State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The trial court merely asked Defendant whether he had entered 
the pleas voluntarily. The trial court did not ask Defendant to 
explain his position nor to explain, in his own words, what he 
13 
believed to be the crimes that he had committed and to which he was 
pleading guilty. Thus, even if the trial court had strictly 
complied with Rule 11 guidelines, the trial court nevertheless 
abused its discretion because Defendant's pleas were, in fact, 
involuntary. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that ""[t]he court has an 
undoubted duty to guard against the possibility that an accused who 
is innocent of the crime charged may be induced to plead guilty 
without sufficient understanding of the nature of the charge or the 
consequences of his plea."" Breckenridge, at 443 (quoting State v. 
Harris, 585 P.2d 450, 452 (Utah 1983) (holding conviction based on 
guilty plea could not stand)). 
Even if the trial court did not engage in a specific 
discussion regarding the Defendant's own understanding of the 
consequences of entering the guilty pleas, the trial court was 
certainly made aware of Defendant's mistaken beliefs at the hearing 
on the motion to withdraw as well as at sentencing. Defendant 
specifically informed the trial court that he was innocent of the 
charged crimes and that he wanted an opportunity to prove this at 
trial. Defendant explained to the trial court that the substance 
which he possessed was not methamphetamine and specifically 
explained the purpose of such substance, the composition of the 
substance, and that it was legally held, to the trial court. 
Additionally, the trial court placed great reliance on the 
fact that the Defendant had been involved in the criminal justice 
system since 1974. Such reliance was misplaced, however, because 
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Defendant's prior experiences in the criminal justice system had 
involved petty actions. Most of the charges Defendant had faced in 
the past had been dismissed. Defendant clearly had not been faced 
with a plea bargain in a felony matter prior to this case. (R.O.A. 
149 - 150.) 
Certainly Defendant's situation in this matter is such that he 
did not have a clear understanding of the charges nor their 
consequences. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing to allow Defendant to withdraw his pleas. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO 
ALLOW DEFENDANT TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE THERE 
WAS NOT A FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE PLEA. 
The trial court should have allowed Defendant to withdraw his 
guilty plea in order to obtain a new drug test and to obtain 
witnesses to testify on his behalf at trial. There was not a 
sufficient factual basis upon which to base Defendant's guilty 
plea. 
The Utah Supreme Court first enunciated the need for a factual 
basis for the plea as a requirement for entry of guilty pleas in 
State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1983). The Court 
"suggested that a valid guilty plea required a "record of facts" 
showing either "that the charged crime was actually committed by 
the defendant, or that the defendant has for some other legitimate 
reason intelligently and voluntarily entered such a plea"". Willet 
v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860, 862 (Utah 1992), quoting Breckenridge, 688 
P.2d at 440. 
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The Willett court clarified the Breckenridae holding, "stating 
that the record must reveal either facts that would support the 
prosecution of a defendant at trial or facts that would suggest a 
defendant faces a substantial risk of conviction at trial, "not 
merely facts establishing the defendant's motivation for entering 
the plea."" State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 672 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993), citing Willett, 842 P.2d at 862. 
In the instant case, the facts simply do not support the 
prosecution of Defendant at trial. Defendant maintained throughout 
the process that he had not been in possession of methamphetamine, 
that he had not distributed methamphetamine, and that he did not 
possess methamphetamine with the intent to distribute. Defendant 
maintained, and specifically informed the trial court, that the 
substance was merely a legal "over-the-counter" item which people 
use to help them stay awake. Because the substance was not 
illegal, Defendant had not committed a crime. Accordingly, there 
is no factual basis with which to prosecute Defendant and there is 
no substantial likelihood that Defendant would be convicted at 
trial. 
Further, there is no indication that the prosecution would be 
prejudiced by allowing Defendant to withdraw his pleas. Defendant 
merely wanted the opportunity to speak to potential witnesses and 
to obtain a more thorough chemical analysis of the substance in 
order to prove that it was not methamphetamine, but was a legal 
substance. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in refusing 
to allow Defendant to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
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III. THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL WITH REGARD TO THE ENTRY OF HIS PLEA IN THIS 
MATTER. 
Defendant's trial counsel was ineffective in representing 
Defendant's interests throughout the entry of Defendant's pleas and 
with regard to Defendant's motion to withdraw the pleas. The Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel is essential to protect the fundamental 
right to a fair trial, the linchpin of our judicial system, and 
thus "plays a crucial role in the adversarial system."" State v. 
Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), quoting Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674 (1984) . 
The landmark case of Strickland v. Washington established a 
firm two-pronged test which must be applied to the facts relevant 
to the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. Utah appellate 
courts have consistently followed this framework. "In order to 
bring a successful ineffectiveness claim, a defendant must show 
that trial counsel's performance was deficient in that it "fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness," and that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial." State 
v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting 
Strickland at 687. 
An ineffectiveness claim "succeeds only when no conceivable 
legitimate tactic or strategy can be surmised from counsel's 
actions." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) (citing State v. Moritzsky. 771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) ) . 
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In this matter Defendant's trial counsel failed to advise 
Defendant as to the nature and elements of the crime to which 
Defendant was pleading guilty. Defendant's trial counsel failed to 
insure that the actual plea which Defendant signed in open court 
was correctly stated. Trial counsel failed to inform Defendant 
that the entry of a guilty plea was a final disposition of the 
matter and would only by withdrawn for good cause. Trial counsel 
further led Defendant to believe that he should plead guilty 
because he would not be able to obtain witnesses to testify on his 
behalf at trial. 
Even more importantly, however, is that after Defendant 
entered the guilty pleas and determined that he wanted to withdraw 
the same, trial counsel failed to file the motion to withdraw 
within the statutory thirty-day period, despite Defendant's 
specific timely request to counsel. The trial court found this 
failure to be jurisdictional and denied the withdrawal. 
Further, at the hearing on Defendant's motion to withdraw the 
guilty pleas, Defendant's trial counsel failed to argue the fact 
that the crime of attempted possession of a controlled substance 
with the intent to distribute had been incorrectly stated on the 
form which Defendant reviewed and signed in open court. Trial 
counsel failed to inform the court that the form had failed to list 
the elements of the crime. Trial counsel failed to inform the 
court that Defendant had been confused in his statement at the time 
of the pleas. The clear reason for trial counsel's failure to do 
so is that counsel was in a conflict at that point, having been the 
18 
one to fill out the form in the first place. 
Defendant's trial counsel also did not make any arguments 
regarding her failure to inform Defendant as to the elements and 
consequences of the pleas. Defendant's trial counsel was in a 
conflict of interest at the point at which Defendant indicated his 
desire to withdraw his guilty pleas. At that point trial counsel 
should have withdrawn and conflict counsel should have been 
appointed. Instead, trial counsel attempted to handle Defendant's 
motion to withdraw. This created an even greater conflict of 
interest and damaged Defendant's position even more. 
This Court has stated that it "will not second-guess trial 
counsel's legitimate strategic choices, however flawed those 
choices might appear in retrospect." Tennyson at 465 (citing 
Strickland, 455 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065). However, trial 
counsel's choices in this action were not legitimate strategic 
choices. Trial counsel failed to withdraw from the case at the 
point at which Defendant indicated that he wished to withdraw his 
guilty pleas. Because the withdrawal of the pleas was based mainly 
upon trial counsel's ineffectiveness, counsel's failure to withdraw 
at that time only served to worsen Defendant's position. Because 
trial counsel did not withdraw at that time, the true reasons for 
Defendant's withdrawal of his plea were not reported to the trial 
court. Moreover, there can be no strategy in missing a 
jurisdictional deadline. Accordingly, Defendant was denied 
effective assistance of counsel in this matter and this case should 
be remanded. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial 
court. The Court should set aside Defendant's guilty pleas and 
should remand this matter for trial on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted this day of November, 1995. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
MARY C. CORPORON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD" JUDICIAL/-DISTRICT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA 
JOE RAKES, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 941900595FS 
JUDGE JOHN A. ROKICH 
COMES NOW the Defendant, JOE RAKES, by and through his 
attorney of record, JUDITH A. JENSEN, and hereby moves the Court 
to withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds that the plea was not 
entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. 
DATED this /? — day of August, 1994. 
( 
<-^^> 
fTH A. JENSEN/' 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111 this // day of Citt^/Qa^. / , 1994. 
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JUDITH A. JENSEN, #4603 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 0? UTAH 
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ISTRICT, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA 
JOE RAKES, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 941900597FS 
JUDGE JOHN A. ROKICH 
COMES NOW the Defendant, JOE RAKES, by and through his 
attorney of record, JUDITH A. JENSEN, and hereby moves the Court 
to withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds that the plea was not 
entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. 
DATED this x day of August, 1994 
orney for Defendant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 Ea^t 400 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111 this day of [lU4tSJ?f U994. 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
ANN BOYDEN, 5043 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
Plaintiff, ) LAW, AND ORDER DENYING 
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
-vs- GUILTY PLEA 
JOE RAKES, 
) CaseNo.941900597FS 
Defendant. 
Judge John A. Rokich 
On August 18, 1994, the defendant, through counsel Judith A. Jensen, moved the court to 
withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant had also entered a guilty plea in Case No. 941900595FS, 
and defense counsel said in a telephone conversation that their intent was to move to withdraw 
both pleas. 
The matter was set for hearing on September 12, 1994. Defendant was present with 
counsel Judith A. Jensen, and Ann Boyden was present for the State. 
Defense counsel asked the court to continue the hearing to give defendant time to do his 
own analysis of the controlled substance. The State responded that it objected to the motion to 
withdraw the plea and that the drug analysis was irrelevant to that motion. 
Third Judicial District 
SEP 2 \ 1994 
By I \ \ ' •u? ;^ 
Deputy Clerk 
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FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA 
Case No. 941900597FS 
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Also, the State had new concerns about further delay since the defendant was now out of 
custody and two new felony charges had been filed against defendant since his entry of guilty 
pleas in the above cases. 
The defendant addressed the court personally concerning his guilty pleas. 
The court then found that the motion to withdraw the pleas was outside the 30-day period 
set forth in 77-13-6, U.C.A., and that the defendant was experienced sufficiently in the justice 
system to understand fully what he was doing when he entered his pleas. 
The court further found that the defendant had knowingly entered the guilty pleas and no 
good cause had been shown to allow for their withdrawal. 
The court therefore DENIED defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty pleas and 
ORDERED the defendant to be sentenced on the matters on September 29, 1994 at 1:30 P.M. 
DATED this /{? day of September, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
JJL A'A^JUL 
JOH^ A. ROKICH, Judge 
Approved as to form: ^"" 
Judith A. Jensen 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Fact, 
Conclusions Of Law, And Order Denying Defendant's Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea was 
delivered to Judith A. Jensen, Attorney for Defendant Joe Rakes, at 424 East 500 South, Suite 
300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the "^ day of September, 1994. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
Plaintiff,
 v (COMMITMENT) 
vs. I Case No. Cf'u l l CCJI / 
•
 0 , Count No. 
r-UiC /Lftkrt"- \ Honorable , ^ / - ^ r fCt k^ti-
Clerk S/ (V f2,h.ih^ 
Reporter < ^ ^ l-.-fh. 
Bailiff / ' ' PhUttnt 
Defendant. Date TfZjJZSM. 
D The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is • granted • denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; • the court; l^plea of guilty; 
a plea of no contest; of the offense of ^ ^ tf** v / s^Vin - ^ ^ 5 A 0/<T
 t a felony 
of the -2£ i i degree, D a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by. i^ , and the State being represented by /?. Hft'iijJ)
 i js now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
D to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be for life; r 
£f not to exceed five years; 
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ ; 
• and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
<£L such sentence is to run concurrently with < > i l. JM L(}p ryi fy/J^_ OL/L/<?C<K> £?5 
D such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, • Court, Count(s) are hereby dismissed. 
D 
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( • prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
• Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County • for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or a for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
£L Commitment shall issue •pn n±h /r.yM 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DATED this / / day of 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page j o f . 
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of the _J^!^legree f D a class 
represented by <J , j f M fr 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
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D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $. to 
S^j{-hiL 0-such sentence is to run concurrently with 
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D Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( • prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
D Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County • for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
R Commitment shall issue _ 
DATED this 
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MARY C. CORPORON #734 
Attorney for Defendant 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 328-1162 
IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
-vs- Case No. 940624-CA 
JOE RAKES, 
De f endant/Appe11ant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, JOE RAKES, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and 
state as follows: 
1. I am the defendant to the above-entitled action and the 
appellant herein. 
2. I was represented in the trial court in this matter by an 
attorney for the Legal Defender Association. I am now represented 
by a new attorney not in conflict with the Legal Defender 
Association. 
3. I entered a plea of guilty in the trial court below. 
<7U& 
Subsequently, I filed a motion to withdraw my plea of guilty. 
4. The elements in the statement I signed in court at the 
time I initially entered my plea were not correctly stated, and the 
crime to which I was entering a plea is not properly stated in that 
form. 
5. I determined after I entered my plea in the trial court 
that I wanted to withdraw my plea of guilty, and I requested my 
attorney from the Legal Defenders Association to file a motion to 
withdraw my plea. This motion was not actually filed by my counsel 
until 31 days after the entry of the plea, past the time limit for 
filing a motion to withdraw my plea. 
6. At the hearing in the trial court regarding my motion to 
withdraw my plea of guilty, the attorney representing me from the 
Legal Defenders Association, failed to argue to the court regarding 
the confusion in my statement at the time of plea regarding the 
elements of the offense, and the crime to which I was entering a 
plea. 
7. I did not have effective assistance of counsel in the 
trial court, because counsel failed properly to advise me at the 
time I entered my plea of guilty, counsel failed to make a motion 
to withdraw my plea of guilty in a timely manner, which the trial 
court found to be jurisdictional, and my counsel failed to make the 
arguments necessary at my motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, 
because counsel was then already in a conflict of interest, in that 
counsel should have argued that the plea was not properly entered 
in the first place, due to the neglect of counsel. 
(g&E RAKES 
Defendant/Appellant 
ON THE V J day of 42L ^ f 
, tho^ undi 
1995, 
personally appeared before me ersigned notary, JOE RAKES, 
the signer of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT, who duly acknowledged to me 
that he signed the same voluntarily and for its stated purpose. 
NOTARY PU8UC 
8TATE0FUWM Notary Public 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon 
& Williams, attorneys for the defendant herein, and that I caused 
the foregoing Affidavit, to be served upon plaintiff by mailing, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the same to: 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
on the ~^ ( day of l ^ ^ i , 1995-
R 
Secretary 
